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OIL AND GAS
by
Gene L. McCoy*
I. NON-PARTICIPATING ROYALTY
URING the survey period, the supreme court decided two significant non-participating royalty cases. In the first, Montgomery v. Rittersbacher,' Montgomery owned a non-participating royalty interest, and

D

Rittersbacher owned the balance of the mineral interest and all of the
executive rights in an 80-acre tract (First Tract). Rittersbacher also owned
the full mineral interest in a tract of 124.19 acres (Second Tract) which
was contiguous with the First Tract. In 1951 Rittersbacher, without
the joinder of Montgomery, entered into an oil and gas lease which covered both tracts. The lease contained a pooling clause and also an entirety

clause which provided:
If the leased premises are now or shall hereafter be owned in severalty or in
separate tracts, the premises, nevertheless, shall be developed and operated as
one lease, and all royalties accruing hereunder shall be treated as an entirety
and shall be divided among and paid to such separate owners in the proportion that the acreage owned by each such separate owner bears to the entire
leased acreage.!
Sun Oil Company, assignee of the lessee, acting pursuant to the lease
pooling authority, formed several units out of the lands under lease, combining portions of the land under the lease with other leased lands owned
by Sun. Eighty acres of the Second Tract were included in the Crutchfield Unit, a unit composed of 320 acres. In October 1956 a producing
well was completed in the Crutchfield Unit on lands other than those covered by the Rittersbacher lease, and commercial production commenced
in May of 1958. Sun included the First Tract in another unit, on which a
dry hole was drilled in July 1961.
In May 1964, six years after the commencement of unit production,
Montgomery sued Sun Oil Company and Rittersbacher for his claimed
share of the royalty accruing to the lease by virtue of production on the
Crutchfield Unit. Montgomery contended that the entirety clause in the
lease compelled an apportionment among the mineral and royalty interest
owners on a surface acreage ratio and that, inasmuch as he had ratified
the lease, he was entitled to be paid according to its terms. In other words,
Montgomery claimed that the facts in question constituted a "double pooling" and that he should receive a net royalty revenue interest from all
unit production, computed as: 1/16x80/204.19x80/320 = .006122 R.I.
Sun and Rittersbacher contended that Rittersbacher, as owner of the ex-

ecutive rights, had no authority to execute an oil and gas lease which
would bind Montgomery's non-participating royalty interest with entirety
A.B., Baylor University; LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1424 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1968).
2 Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
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or pooling clauses and, in any event, Montgomery had not ratified the
lease. The trial court and the court of civil appeals' held for Sun and
Rittersbacher, principally upon the grounds asserted by them. However,
the supreme court reversed the lower courts and remanded for a precise
determination of the percentage of unit production which Montgomery
was entitled to receive, based upon Montgomery's theory of interest.
In its opinion, the supreme court stated that the concept of crossconveyancing is still an extremely viable doctrine in any pooling situation.'
Also, the court reaffirmed cases' holding that the owner of the executive
rights cannot pool the interest of a non-participating royalty owner in the
absence of that owner's consent. However, because Rittersbacher purported to bind Montgomery's interest by the entirety and pooling clauses
in the lease, the court held that Montgomery had an option to ratify or
repudiate the unauthorized lease. The court further held that the conduct
of Montgomery, as a matter of law, constituted a ratification of the lease
and entitled him to share in unit production.
There were two unauthorized poolings in Montgomery. The initial pooling resulted, at least according to the opinion, from the inclusion in the
lease of the "now owned" entirety clause.! The second pooling resulted
from the lessee's exercise of the pooling power conferred by the lease pooling clause. The only other significant method by which the executive
holder may attempt to pool the interest of a non-participating royalty
owner is the community lease. 7 Although the facts in Montgomery would
have permitted the court to predicate the initial pooling upon the existence of a community lease,' the court chose not to do so. Rather, it stressed
'Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 410 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
See Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W.2d 472 (1942).
"Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943). See also Minchen v. Fields, 162 Tex.
73, 345 S.W.2d 282 (1961).
6A "now owned" entirety clause means the type quoted supra at note 2. Thomas Gilcrease
Foundation v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 153 Tex. 197, 266 S.W.2d 850 (1954), established that
the "now owned" language resulted in an apportionment of royalties upon the mere execution of
the lease without regard to the subsequent conduct of the lessor or lessee. It is the only case, other
than the principal case, with this interpretation. Cf. Jul-Tex Drilling Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 201 F.
Supp. 874 (D. Colo. 1962). For a discussion of this type clause and other entirety clauses, see
McCoy, The Entirety Clause-Its Current Use and Interpretation, 12 RocKy MT. MIN. L. INST.
317 (1967). It should be observed that pooling will not result from the more ordinary entirety
clause.
It is possible, of course, that the executive owner might attempt to pool the interest of a
non-participating royalty owner by attempting to commit the non-participating royalty owner's
land to a field-wide type unit formed by agreement of the parties rather than under lease pooling
authority. The principal case does not answer whether the non-participating royalty owner would
have the right to ratify or repudiate this kind of unauthorized act. The opinion states that the
option relates to "a lease containing provisions which as to his interest the holder of executive rights
had no authority to insert in the lease." 424 S.W.2d at 215 (emphasis added). Thus, it may well
be that an unauthorized act made without relation to the execution of the lease itself may be absolutely
void and not subject to ratification.
8
Although Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943), and Nugent v. Freeman,
refused to find the existence of com306 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), error ref. n.r.e.,
munity leases in instances where the executive owners made leases covering two or more segregated
tracts, in only one of which the non-participating and non-joining royalty owners had interests,
the rationale, but not the result, of these decisions is the same as in the Montgomery case, i.e., the
executive owner is simply devoid of power to pool the non-joining non-participating royalty interest. These cases do not compel the conclusion that, with proper ratification, there may be no
community lease under such facts. In this regard, see Standard Oil Co. v. Donald, 321 S.W.2d
602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), error ref. n.r.e., which held that a community lease could exist under
4
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the effect of this special entirety clause. The decision would have been
more meaningful had the court adopted the community lease approach in
preference to the entirety clause And, although not fully answered by
Montgomery, it may be hoped that any pooling resulting from an unauthorized act of the executive holder will give the non-participating royalty owner an option to ratify or repudiate the unauthorized act.
Montgomery makes it clear that the execution of an unauthorized lease
by the executive holder is not a void act, and that "the non-participating
royalty owner has the option to ratify or repudiate a lease containing provisions which as to his interest the holder of executive rights had no authority to insert in the lease."'" The opinion implies that there can be no
partial ratification." While not discussed, it would likewise seem to follow that there may be no partial repudiation, although Mathews v. Sun
Oil Co."a indicates otherwise.
Once it has been determined that the circumstances exist which confer upon the royalty owner an option to repudiate or reject an unauthorized lease, the period of time in which the election must be made and the
method by which the election is evidenced become pertinent. In Montgomery there was evidence that, prior to filing suit, Montgomery had made
demand upon the other parties for his proportionate share of accrued royalties and that, on at least one occasion, he affirmatively stated that he was
willing to ratify and would execute any necessary ratification document.
Rittersbacher and Sun contended that Montgomery's statements constituted merely a conditional offer to ratify, which they never accepted. The
supreme court, implying that the issue of ratification is not to be determined on ordinary contractual principles, resolved the issue with this
language:
This evidence demonstrates Montgomery's intention to ratify the lease, and
by filing suit to enforce the lease as written, Montgomery, as a matter of law,
has exercised his option to ratify the lease. We think that the manner in
which he has exercised his option is analogous to the manner by which a principal can ratify the unauthorized actions of an agent-bringing a suit to
enforce the unauthorized act. 3
It should be noted that Montgomery claimed not only that he was entitled to share in unit production, but also that he was entitled to his full
one-half nonparticipating interest under the First Tract. Certainly, the
thesecircumstances. For a discussion generally of the community lease, see L.
TARY POOLING AND

UNITIZATION

9

HOFFMAN,

VOLUN-

(1954).

' Although unsupported by statistics, my general impression is that there are many more community leases than leases with "now owned" entirety clauses. Moreover, predicating the opinion on
the community lease approach would have obviated the affirmation and extension of the questionable Gilcrease decision.
'0424 S.W.2d at 215.
"I Interestingly, Montgomery attempted what seems tantamount to a partial ratification, i.e.,
he claimed not only that he was entitled to share in unit production, but also that he was entitled
to his full one-half non-participating interest in the First Tract. The court merely stated that
"Montgomery, having thus ratified the lease, is as much bound thereby as if he had joined in the
original execution thereof. As long as the lease is in force, he is not free to claim his full Y2 nonparticipating interest under 'First Tract.' " 424 S.W.2d at 215.
12425 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1968).
'a424 S.W.2d at 214.
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latter claim was not compatible with a complete adoption of the unauthorized lease. The supreme court did not fully analyze this ambivalent
position but merely stated that Montgomery was not entitled to an unpooled interest in the First Tract. Accordingly, we are left to surmise what
conduct short of the actual filing of a lawsuit will constitute a ratification,
or for that matter, a rejection of the unauthorized lease.
The most untenable part of the decision is the holding allowing Montgomery to wait six years after he had knowledge of the gas production before making his election. In a quite similar case, 4 a court of civil appeals
held that filing suit within two years of the commencement of production was not a sufficient ratification of the lease. There, the court stressed
that after the lease had been fully developed, the non-participating royalty
owner lost the right to exercise the option. Apparently, the lease involved
in Montgomery also was fully developed and the only justification for allowing Montgomery to make his dilatory election was the failure to make
an appropriate plea of laches. Chief Justice Calvert, in dissent, pointed out
that in some circumstances a non-participating royalty owner with full
knowledge of his rights may lose his right to ratify the lease through
laches. A non-participating royalty owner who finds that he may opt between production on a non-apportioned basis from his tract or production
on a pooled basis with other tracts will want to remain uncommitted for
the greatest allowable period of time. The non-participating royalty owner
thus will have an opportunity to watch the development of his tract
compared with the development of the other tract in which he has inchoate rights to share and then, weighing the relative production, make
the most propitious election. The only drawback to this approach is
the holding in Montgomery that the election as to pooled production may
not be retroactive; the court expressly found that Montgomery was entitled to royalty payments from and after the date suit was filed.
In the second non-participating royalty decision, Mathews v. Sun Oil
Co., 5 the owners of the executive rights executed a single oil and gas

lease covering two contiguous sections. The lease provided for a primary
term of five years and "as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is
produced from the land hereinabove described."'" At the time this lease
was executed there were outstanding 1/16th non-participating royalty
interests in each tract, the royalty interest in each tract being owned by
different parties. A well was commenced on one section prior to the end
of the primary term and completed thereafter as a commercial producer.
No well was drilled on the other section, and after the expiration of the
primary term, the lessors and owners of the non-participating royalty in
the section upon which no well had been drilled brought suit to terminate
the lease insofar as it covered that section. The plaintiffs contended that
the executive holder, while he had the power to execute oil and gas leases,
did not possess the right to execute a lease to the detriment or disadvan'"Nugent v. Freeman, 306 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), error ref. n.r.e.
'5425 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1968).
'lId. at 333.
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tage of the non-participating royalty owners under either section described in the lease. In the alternative, it was contended that if the executive holder did have the right to execute the lease, the effect of such lease
would be a separate lease as to each section of land and, inasmuch as there
was no producing well or other activity on the section owned by them,
the lease terminated as to that section. The supreme court, in affirming
both lower courts, held that the leased premises were to be considered
as a single tract for the purposes of satisfying the habendum clause and
perpetuating the lease by production.
While the opinion is limited, correctly, to the "sole issue" of the continuation of the leasehold estate, some obvious problems of pooling and apportionment of royalty are implied in the facts. One question is whether
the non-participating royalty owner in Mathews might be entitled to a
proportionate share of production from the producing tract. In light of
Montgomery, it seems that the non-participating royalty owner, by filing
suit, elected to repudiate rather than ratify the lease. Accordingly, it appears that he is not entitled to production on a pooled basis. If the conduct of the non-participating royalty owner in Mathews may be correctly
characterized as a repudiation of the lease, it follows that an election to
repudiate, unlike an election to ratify, it not necessarily total (i.e., the
habendum and "thereafter" clauses may not be repudiated).
It should be noted that Mathews will not preclude a non-participating
royalty owner from demanding, by appropriate action, that his tract be
properly developed. This conclusion is supported by the court's statement
that the executive holder cannot make a lease which would "prevent, hamper or stifle production to the prejudice"1 of the non-participating royalty
owner. Therefore, while the lease may be considered a single lease for the
purpose of the habendum clause, apparently there are nevertheless two separate leases with respect to the obligations of the lessee. He will be required to respect the interior boundaries of the lease for the purpose of development and protection against drainage and may also have the burden
to provide separate measuring tanks, records, and books in order to measure and account for the production from each tract.
It would have been gross error to find that the lease considered in
Mathews had terminated as to both sections with respect to the entire mineral interest. Moreover, it would have been error to allow termination of
the lease as to the mineral estate of the executive holder, for that would
have allowed him to profit by his unauthorized act. In this regard, the
court must have been influenced by the fact that even if it had granted
the relief sought by the non-participating royalty owner, he would not
have been directly benefitted. The court may also have been influenced by
the fact that this suit was filed after production had been obtained on the
lease and by the fact that the holder of the executive rights and the nonparticipating royalty owner were in alliance in the suit. Possibly, there
may be a different result in a similar suit brought by the non-participating
royalty owner where these factors are absent.
17 Id.
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Mathews and Montgomery both stressed that there is some duty of fair
dealing owed by the executive power to the non-participating royalty
owner, although neither case fully articulated a definition of that duty."
The supreme court presumably prefers to decide each case on an ad hoc
basis. In Montgomery the court merely stated that the executive owner,
in exercising the executive rights, "had a duty to protect the non-participating royalty owner."'" In Mathews the court defined the duty negatively: "[The executive owner] would not be authorized to make a contract binding upon the non-participating royalty owners which would prevent, hamper, or stifle production to the prejudice of such owners, and
while he may lease and thus vest title to a working interest under such
lease, he may not convey the reserved royalty interest."'"

II. THE DUHIG DOCTRINE
The decision of the supreme court in Forest v. Hanson" is important
because of the restriction placed upon the now familiar and quasi-ubiquitous doctrine of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co." An understanding of the principles of the case is facilitated by rephrasing and simplifying the facts.
A, the owner of the fee in a full section of land, deeded the entire section to B, but reserved the mineral rights in the East Half. Thereafter, B
conveyed the entire section to others, and, by mesne conveyances, the
section was ultimately conveyed to D. Due to an abstractor's error, the
reservation of minerals in the East Half in favor of A was not included in the abstract of title; thus the reservation was not mentioned
in any of the mesne conveyances into D, who presumably was unaware
of it. D then conveyed to P, by warranty deed, the entire section but
reserved to himself the minerals in the South Half of the section. P
assumed he acquired good title to the minerals in the entire North Half,
whereas the Northeast Quarter in fact was owned by A. P sued D for
breach of warranty for the title failure to the minerals in the Northeast
Quarter and, predicated upon the Duhig doctrine, claimed he was entitled
to D's mineral interest in the Southwest Quarter. In other words, the
plaintiff contended that inasmuch as the breach of warranty resulted in
the loss to him of 160 acres (the NE/4), he would be made whole by having substituted therefor the 160 acres owned by D (the SW/4).

The supreme court rejected P's argument and held that he was entitled
to money damages only for the breach. In Duhig the court, applying the

estoppel principle of the after-acquired title cases, held that the grantor
was estopped to deny ownership of the reserved interest not because the
title to the disputed one-half mineral interest had been acquired after the
grantor had purported to sell it, but because he had retained the very in"See

Elliot, The Executive Right, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 865

Royalty, 26 TEXAs L. REV.

569,

580-85

(1964); Jones, Non-Participating

(1948).

9424 S.W.2d at 213.
"Mathews v. Sun Oil Co., 425 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. 1968).
"424
92135

S.W.2d 899 (Tex. 1968).
Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878

(1940).
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terest which would make his defective conveyance good. In the present
case, the court noted that the grantor owned no interest in the minerals
in the specific tract where title failed, and stated: "The Duhig doctrine is
a doctrine of estoppel and not one of replacement."2 The result is that the
doctrine of Duhig is limited to instances in which the grantor retains an
undivided interest in the particular tract in which title failed. Title examiners should be delighted with this holding, for had the court affirmed
the opinion of the court of civil appeals, title examiners would be forced
in many instances to examine title to land other than the specific one
under consideration in order to determine whether the doctrine of estoppel might apply to the land under examination.
The Duhig doctrine was considered again by the Texas Supreme Court
in McClung v. Lawrence.' In this case the McClungs conveyed to the
Lawrences by general warranty deed, seventeen tracts of land containing
approximately 1,800 acres. The deed contained this reservation:
The grantors hereby reserving unto themselves one fourth of all of the oil,
gas and/or minerals in, on or upon the above described land; however the
grantees herein their heirs and assigns are hereby empowered and authorized
to lease said land for oil, gas or other minerals without the joinder of the
grantors herein in making any such lease or leases; and it is expressly stipulated
that said grantors, their heir or assigns shall not participate in any bonus or
delay rentals paid grantees under any such lease or leases upon the leasing of
said land the interest of the said grantors, their heirs and assigns shall be and
become a 1/32 (one thirty second) royalty interest under such leases it being
the intention hereby to reserve and retain in said grantors a non participating
1/32 royalty interest in and to the oil, gas or other minerals in, on or under
the land hereby conveyed.25
This deed was executed and recorded in May 1947. At the time the deed
was executed there were outstanding mineral and royalty interests in
some of the tracts but the deed made no reference or exception to those
interests. The McClungs contended that they were entitled in all instances
to an undivided 1/32nd royalty interest upon the leasing of the tracts by
the Lawrences and they brought suit seeking such a construction. Alternatively, they sought reformation of the deed because it failed to make clear
that the reservation of the non-participating royalty interest was in addition to any prior outstanding mineral or royalty interest. The supreme
court held that the quoted reservation was unambiguous and should
in fact be construed in favor of the Lawrences under the doctrine of
Duhig. Thus, the 1/32nd reserved interest of the McClungs was reduced
to make good any deficiency under the conveyance to the Lawrences. Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that the reservation created
two interests, distinguishing Benge v. Sharbauer" and similar cases. With
respect to the action for reformation, the court of civil appeals had held,
as a matter of law, that the parties were charged with knowledge of the
Forrest v. Hanson, 424 S.W.2d 899, 904 (Tex. 1968).
S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1968).
22Id. at 179-80.
26 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953); see 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW S 340 (1959).
'

'4430
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provisions of the deed from the date of its execution and that limitation
on the claim for reformation commenced to run from the date of the execution of the deed. The supreme court distinguished the cases cited by
the court of civil appeals as being cases which dealt with mineral deeds
where one of the parties claimed a provision was entirely omitted, as contrasted with the situation here where the parties were alleged to have
been mutually mistaken as to the legal effect of the language contained
inthe deed.
III.

TERM ROYALTY

The stereotype printed form for conveying a term royalty generally
specifies that the granted interest shall continue for a specified number of

years and "as long thereafter as oil, gas or other minerals, or either of
them, is produced" from the land conveyed. This language, standing alone,

generally constitutes the whole content of the contract on the subject of
the perpetuation of the term royalty. Our courts have quite properly and
uniformly refused to abrogate this form of contract by amending or adding clauses which the parties did not spell out in the written document."
However, this rigid judicial construction is somewhat ameliorated by
decisions which hold that even though the royalty deed does not expressly provide that the term royalty will continue in the event of temporary
cessation of production, such language is necessarily implied. In a recent
court of civil appeals opinion, where the facts showed a well which had
been producing in paying quantities for more than fourteen years was
shut down for a period of fifteen months and then brought back into
production, the court held, as a matter of law, that the8 cessation of propermanent.
duction was only temporary as opposed to
IV.

LEASE CLAUSES

The important Vela" litigation, which should have been the catalyst for
oil and gas lessors and lessees to re-examine their lease agreements, culminated this past year. The supreme court affirmed the court of civil
appeals and held that the price received by the royalty owners under a
long term gas-sales contract does not establish "market price" within the
meaning of the royalty clause of the oil and gas lease. Rather, "market
price" is to be ascertained by comparable sales of gas. In Vela the lessors,
in 1933, executed an oil and gas lease providing for royalty on gas of
"one-eighth of the market price at the wells."" In 1935 the lessees entered
into a long term (life of the lease) gas-sales contract with the only purchaser who then had a pipe line in the field. The contract provided that
the lessees dedicated all of the gas under the leased premises for the term
17For example, where there is no actual production but the lease covering the same land as the
term royalty is being held by the payment of shut-in royalty payments, the courts repeatedly have
refused to interpolate a shut-in royalty clause in the conveyance. See Sellers v. Breidenbach, 300
S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), error ref.
2Campbell v. Seaman, 427 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
29Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).

1id. at 868.
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of the lease and that the purchaser was to pay 2.3 cents per m.c.f. for all
gas delivered and purchased under the contract. From 1935 all of the gas
produced from the lease was marketed in accordance with this contract.
Then, from 1959 to 1962, additional gas discoveries were made in the
field and other purchasers entered into gas contracts providing for prices
ranging from 13 to 17 cents per m.c.f. In 1964 the royalty owners
brought suit against the lessees to recover alleged royalty deficiences for
the years 1960 to 1964, contending that 2.3 cents per m.c.f. did not correspond with the "market price" royalty clause of the lease. The trial court
found that the market value of the gas was 13.04 cents net per m.c.f. and
granted the royalty owners recovery for the difference in price for the
four-year period under consideration.
In a five-to-four decision, the supreme court affirmed the district court
and court of civil appeals and, in so doing, dismissed rather summarily
the lessees' argument that the "market price" of gas within the meaning
of the lease is the price contracted for in good faith by the lessee in pursuance of its duty to market gas from the lease. Moreover, the court stated
that since none of the royalty owners ever agreed to accept royalties on
the basis of the gas contract, their royalty payments should be determined
by the language of the lease. The opinion affirmed the reasoning of the
court of civil appeals that "market price" as used in the lease meant the
"prevailing market price at the time of the sale or use," 1 and that the gas
which was marketed under the long term contract was not "sold" at the
time the contract was made but at the time of delivery to the purchaser.
The criterion to prove "market price" was said to be "sales of gas comparable in time, quality and availability to marketing outlets."'" Moreover,
the court stated, "the mathematical average of all prices paid in the field
is not a final answer to the difficult problem of determining marketing
price at any particular time.""
The Vela opinion seemingly ignored the nature of the gas industry
which requires, because of the heavy capital expenditures for pipe lines
and facilities, that gas be sold by long term contracts. Moreover, the court
attributed no effect to the implied duty of the lessee to market gas and
use reasonable diligence to secure the highest price obtainable for the gas.
Presumably, the lessees in the instant case did exercise reasonable diligence
and obtained the best market price available at the time. The dissent argued quite cogently that the majority was oblivious to these vital factors.
Further, the dissent stressed that since the royalty provision of the lease
did not state at what point in time market price was to be determined,
the court should look at the practices of the industry at the time the lease
was executed in 1933. This approach, the dissent remarked, showed that
the parties knew when they entered into the lease that gas would be marketed on a long term contract at a fixed price.
In an impeccable understatement, the supreme court stated that "[t]he
"

tId. at 871.
Id. at 872.
I d. at 873.
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lease obligation may prove financially burdensome to a lessee who has made
a long-term contract without protecting itself against increases in market
price." Under the facts of the present case, the lessees will receive a total
of 2.3 cents per m.c.f. and they will pay the royalty owners a total of
1.63 cents per m.c.f. (1/8th of 13.047 cents per m.c.f.). This means that
the leasehold interest has been reduced from 87.5 per cent to 30 per cent
and may likely mean an operating loss for the lessees. Conceivably, under
the court's holding a lessee could in fact be required to pay the royalty
owners more than he actually receives for the gas sold.'
Vela deserves careful examination by all lessors and lessees, and the prudent lessee who finds that his lease has this objectionable royalty clause
will attempt promptly to obtain modifications of the lease or perhaps,
more expediently, will find methods to have the gas contract ratified by
the royalty owner. Many division orders probably will now be amended
to include express reference to any gas contract made by the lessee with
language manifesting royalty owner approval and ratification. On the
other hand, royalty owners should be warned to scrutinize carefully division orders which may contain such language.
On a collateral issue, the supreme court held that two of the royalty
owners were not equitably estopped to claim they were entitled to be paid
on the basis approved in the opinion even though they were at one time
owners of part of the working interest and in that capacity had expressly
ratified the gas purchase contract. And, on another issue, the court construed the notice of breach clause in the lease to mean that a lessor is not
precluded from recovering damages for drainage which occurred prior to
the time he gave written notice to the lessee under the terms of this clause
of the lease.'
V.

LEASEHOLD ASSIGNMENTS

In three cases involving "farmouts" the dominant issue was the proper
measure of damage for a breach by the assignee of the farmout agreement.
In the first case, the assignee failed to give his assignor actual notice, as

required by the farmout agreement, prior to dropping the assigned leases
Id. at 871.
" Query: Would this mean the lease is subject to termination for failure to produce in "paying
quantities"? See, e.g., Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
asMore specifically, the supreme court said: "The parties could not have intended that the
lessor would be forever barred from recovering damages sustained prior to the giving of notice,
and we hold that the first two sentences quoted above apply only to actions to cancel the lease
and not to suits for damages." 429 S.W.2d at 875. The clause in question reads:
In the event lessor considers that lessee has not complied with all its obligations
hereunder, both express and implied, before production has been secured or after
production has been secured, lessor shall notify lessee in writing, setting out specifically
in what respects lessee has breached this contract. Lessee shall then have sixty (60)
days after receipt of said notice within which to meet or commence to meet all or
any part of the breaches alleged by lessor. The service of said notice shall be
precedent to the bringing of any action by lessor on said lease for any cause and no
such action shall be brought until the lapse of sixty (60) days after service of such
notice on lessee. Neither the service of said notice nor the doing of any acts by
lessee aimed to meet all or any of the alleged breaches shall be deemed an admission
or presumption that lessee has failed to perform all its obligations hereunder.
Id. at 874-75.
.4
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for nonpayment of delay rentals." For this dereliction, damages were assessed on the basis of the market value ($5.00 per acre) of the leasehold
estates wrongfully terminated. The supreme court remanded the case,
however, because of the introduction, over objection, of inadmissible evidence. In the other two cases the assignee failed to drill required wells. In
one case the wronged plaintiff recovered nothing, apparently because he
chose an improper theory of damages."a The plaintiff attempted to recover
on a loss of profit theory, which required proof that he and the breaching
party at the inception of the contract contemplated the operative facts
upon which this measure of damage is predicated: namely, a showing that
the plaintiff intended to and would have sold his retained interest at the
alleged value.
The damage issue in the last case was decided in accordance with Louisiana law and is not significant for this Survey.39 What is significant, however, is the interpretation of the word "completed" urged by the defendant-assignee. The farmout agreement provided that the assignee had no
obligation to drill a second test well until the first well was "completed."
The assignee contended unsuccessfully that the word "completed" meant
completed as a producer and not as a dry hole, and inasmuch as the first
well was dry, he had no duty to drill the second well. Under the facts
of the case, the court's rejection of the assignee's argument seems
correct. However, the fastidious draftsman will recognize that a different
court under comparable circumstances conceivably could find the word
ambiguous.
The measure of damages for breach of warranty of title as a result of a
partial failure of title generally is an amount which bears the same ratio
to the total consideration paid the warrantor as the value of the interest
which has failed bears to the value of the whole interest purchased.4 One
civil appeals case, 4' which did not question this general rule, illustrates the
difficulty in proving and applying this test to a leasehold interest when the
failure of title is predicated upon the existence of an outstanding slidingscale (depending upon natural flow or artificial lift) overriding royalty.
The court also held that the four-year statute of limitations, rather than
the two-year statute, governs the cause of action for recovery of deficient
payments brought by the overriding royalty owner."
The viability of the ordinary overriding royalty depends upon the continuation of the leasehold estate from which the override is carved. In an
interesting case"' involving an aggrieved overriding royalty owner, the
court of civil appeals held that in a contest between the owner of the
override and the working interest owner, the burden of showing that the
" McLaughlin v. Ball, 431 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. 1968).
"Dunham v. Stephens, 423 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
"Seale v. Major Oil Co., 428 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
4
See Hynes v. Packard, 92 Tex. 44, 45 S.W. 562 (1898).
"' French v. Bank of the Southwest, 422 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
42Compare Hull v. Freedman, 383 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), error ref. n.r.e., which
applied the two-year statute in an action by the lessee against the lessor under similar facts.
43Gasperson v. Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell Co., 418 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967),
error ref. n.r.e.
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leasehold estate was maintained in force and effect was upon the overriding royalty owner. The overriding royalty owner contended alternatively that even if the prior leasehold estate from which his override was
carved had lapsed, he was entitled to have his overriding royalty interest
ingrafted on a new lease taken by the same lessee some nine months after
the expiration of the earlier lease. The court refused to grant this relief,
stating that whether the new lease was in renewal and extension" of the
prior lease was a fact question on which the plaintiff had not sustained the
burden of proof. Moreover, the court refused to find that the override
existed on a constructive trust theory.'
VI.

SURFACE RIGHTS

Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker," which portended the resolution of many of
the vagaries of the conflicting rights of oil and gas operators and surface
owners in and to underground fresh water, was decided by the supreme
court this past year. Unfortunately, the court carefully avoided the substantive issues of the case and rested its decision on procedural grounds
"neither urged on appeal by the appellee-respondent nor noticed by the
court of civil appeals." 7 Whitaker involved the right of Sun Oil Company
to use fresh water underlying its lease in its water flooding operations on
the lease. At issue was an interpretation of the free use clause, which provided that "Lessee shall have free use of oil, gas, coal, wood and water
from said land except water from Lessor's wells for all operations hereunder." 8 The court of civil appeals found the phrase "all operations
hereunder" ambiguous and, based upon the presumed intention of the
lessor and lessee at the time of execution of the lease, held that Sun did
not have the right to use the water for water flooding purposes.' Hopefully, the important issues raised by Whitaker will again be before the
supreme court at an early date.
In another contest between surface owner and oil and gas lessee, the
supreme court reaffirmed the mineral estate's dominance, repeating the
rule that a surface owner who seeks to recover from the lessee for damages to the surface has the burden to prove either specific acts of negligence or that more land was used by the lessee than was reasonably necessary." In this case, Humble had constructed a road, thirty feet in width,
with a gravel base and a black top surface, across the leased land to its
drilling site. In constructing the road, which was built about two feet
higher than the surrounding land, Humble had cut or pushed down some
315 small pine trees. There was also evidence that Humble had made deep
"'The assignment document creating the override expressly stated that the override would
apply to "a renewal or extension of primary term of any of the assigned leases on or before 90
days from the expiration date of each assigned lease." Gasperson v. Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell
Co., 418 S.W.2d 345, 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
'The court found Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1967), dispositive
of this issue. 418 S.W.2d at 356.
46424 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1968).
47
1 d. at 218.
48

Id.

" Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 412 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
0
" Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1967).
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ruts in the area near the drilling site which was used for parking and
other vehicular purposes. Because the plaintiff introduced no proof of negligence or proof that Humble used more of the land than was reasonably
necessary to conduct its operation, he did not recover.
Some erosion of the dominance of the mineral estate is reflected in an
opinion by the Beaumont court of civil appeals." The lessee acquired in
1931 a lease covering an undivided 300-acre tract. At the time of the suit,
the lease had fifteen producing wells on it, and the surface ownership had
been divided among several owners. Many years subsequent to the lease,
the defendant acquired the surface ownership of a 65-acre tract on which
were situated three wells and a meter run. The oil and gas lessee's only
means of access to these installations was over four separate roads, each of
which it used daily. Prior to the defendant's purchase of the tract, these
roads had always been open. The defendant, however, built a fence around
his tract and placed wire gates across the roads in question. The lessee sued
to enjoin the use of the gates. The lessee introduced evidence that the
presence of the gates required its employees to alight from and re-enter
their vehicles five times in order to service each well on the 65-acre tract.
In the absence of the gates, they would be required to alight from their
vehicles only once to service each well thereon. The lessee also attempted
to introduce evidence showing the expense imposed on it in the operation
of the 300-acre tract if barriers were erected on the balance of the land
in accordance with the various surface ownership. The trial court, in connection with a special issue which inquired whether the surface owner's
conduct in erecting the gates constituted an unreasonable interference
with the lessee's operations, instructed the jury to weigh the injury caused
to the lessee by the gates against the utility of the gates to the surface
owner. 2
This case must be considered an aberration, for it apparently is the
first to adopt a weighing of relative inconvenience and value among
the surface owner and oil and gas lessee. If the tract were subdivided
among a great many surface owners and each of them placed similar barriers, the expense to the lessee might become quite significant. Thus, the
exclusion of testimony with regard to the hypothetical future surface use
of the lease is questionable. The lessee should have the right to have the
court' consider the cumulative effect of actual surface interference by all
surface owners on the lease.
A federal case considered a mineral deed which provided that "on
grantors' request all pipe lines laid across any of said land to be tilled shall
be placed below plow depth." The oil operator argued that the term
591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error 'ref. n.r.e.
In answering the foregoing Special Issue, you are instructed that a determination of
whether the erection of such gates by Defendant is 'unreasonable' involves weighing
the degree of harm or inconvenience such gates cause to Plaintiff against the utility
of such gates to Defendant and the suitability of other measures which would
substantially serve the purpose of such gates to Defendant at less or no inconvenience or harm to Plaintiff.
Id. at 594.
"Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan, 385 F.2d 951, 952 (5th Cir. 1967). Compare Manges v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 394 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1968).
" Getty Oil Co. v. Royal, 422 S.W.2d
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"tilled" could not mean root plowing inasmuch as the modern root plowing technique was unknown in 1926, the date of the deed. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and required the operator to bury its pipeline.
However, the court did agree with the trial court that the plow depth
contemplated was only twelve inches below the surface and not the additional depth necessary to effect root plowing.
Closely related to the surface rights of the mineral lessee are the rights
of holders of pipe line easements. In Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Razo,"4 Phillips in 1956 acquired a pipe line easement across river bottom land. The
land, which was heavily wooded and marshy, was entirely rural in character and used only for the occasional grazing of a few head of cattle. The
right of way was cleared sometime thereafter, and at the time the pipe
was lawu in 1960, the landowner had begun using part of the cleared right
of way as a private road. In 1961 the landowner granted a second pipe
line right of way to Monsanto Chemical Company. This line was to be
located about 500 feet north of Phillips' pipe line. The subcontractor who
cleared Monsanto's right of way obtained permission from the landowner
to use the private road to bring in its equipment. In using this private
road, the subcontractor's bulldozer struck the Phillips pipe line, which exploded, injuring the operator of the bulldozer. In a suit against Phillips,
the injured operator recovered damages of $304,208. The trial court
found that Phillips was negligent in failing to bury the pipe line at a
proper depth, in failing to inspect properly, and in failing to give proper
warning of the pipe line. The Tyler court of civil appeals affirmed, although it required a remittitur of $104,288.' s
Relying upon the 1963 opinion of Pioneer Natural Gas Co. v. K dq M
Paving Co.,' the supreme court reversed the lower courts and reaffirmed
that a pipe line operator has a duty to avoid damages from occurrences
such as leaks and breaks in the pipe which could result from the ordinary
use of the surface by others. Considering the type of road overlying the
pipe line and the rural location, the court concluded that the only foreseeable ordinary use was by pickup or jeep, and Phillips was therefore not
obligated to bury its pipe line to protect against this extraordinary use by
a bulldozer.
VII.

OTHER OPERATIONAL CASES

The State of Texas levies an occupation tax on the business of producing
gas amounting to seven per cent of the market value of the gas produced."
Among the statutory exceptions is "gas used for lifting oil."'" In Calvert
v. Kadane" the supreme court construed this exception to be inapplicable to gas consumed for fuel in an internal combustion motor used to
S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1967).
"Phillips
Pipe Line Co. v. Razo, 409 S.W.2d
S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1967).
56374 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. 1963).
" TEX. TAX-GEN. ANN. art. 3.01 (1960).
58 Id. art. 3.01 (2) (b).
"9427 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1968).
54420

565

(Tex.

Civ. App.

1966),

rev'd, 420
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operate a pump which "lifted" the oil on these leases to the surface. Four
of the justices dissented, noting rather cogently that the majority's statutory interpretation was inordinately literal.
By virtue of article 5474,"0 a contractor who furnishes material used in
the drilling of an oil well is entitled to a lien "on the whole of such land
or leasehold interest therein, . . . for which said materials, machinery or
supplies were furnished . . . ." In a court of civil appeals opinion," a contractor contended that the language "the whole of such land or leasehold
interest" meant the entire portion of the base lease owned by the operator
to whom he furnished material. The court held, however, in view of a
stipulation between the parties that the base lease owned by the same operator was known by the parties as three separate tracts, that each separate
tract would be treated as an entire leasehold interest for purposes of the
statutory lien. The case poses many questions as to how and when an operator may unilaterally segregate one base lease owned by him into numerous tracts for purposes of limiting statutory liens and should be a
caveat to lenders and purchasers of less than the full base lease.
VIII.

UNITIZATION, COMMUNITIZATION AND SPACING

One of the few cases construing the language of the modern unitization
agreement arose this past year."2 The court examined and discussed several
provisions of a rather standard unit operating agreement with special scrutiny of the adjustment of investment provisions. The court concluded
that, under the language of this agreement, the intangible investment
and inventory investment provisions of the operating agreement had to
be considered together to determine whether a working interest owner was
to be credited or debited for his total unit investments. In another case,
construction of the participation phases of a unit agreement was not fully
considered because of procedural defects. 3 The court comprehensively discussed estoppel as to the unit agreement.
In a rule 37 case decided during the survey period, the court attacked
the Railroad Commission's determination of what constituted an illegal
subdivision in the East Texas field."4 The Railroad Commission granted a
permit to a tract of .107 acres under its "long established policy" governing subdivision of tracts in the East Texas field which were created prior
to the Commission's order of May 29, 1934, the date used by the Commission to determine illegal subdivisions in the East Texas field. Inasmuch
as the small tract involved in this suit was created prior to that date, the
Commission maintained that the permit granted for the tract was entirely
proper. The court of civil appeals disagreed and held that rule 37 became
applicable to the parent tract in 1931, the date it was first leased for oil
'OTEx.

REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5474

61Dunigan

n.r.e.

(1958).

Tool & Supply Co. v. Burris, 427 S.W.2d 341

(Tex. Civ. App. 1968),

error ref.

(Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
"' Pennzoil v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 421 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
14Railroad Comm'n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 424 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
error ref. n.r.e.
62Producing Properties, Inc. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 428 S.W.2d 365

OIL AND GAS

1969]

and gas purposes and prior to its subdivision. Therefore, this tract was not
entitled to a permit as an exception to rule 37.
In an interpleader action involving ownership of royalties under a unit,
Judge Goldberg wrote a most erudite opinion which he characterized as
an inquiry into "the penumbral areas of the law of royalty apportionment." The court held: (1) A communitized lease may exist when several lessors join in the execution of a lease even though each has a uniform
undivided interest in all of the tracts included within the lease; (2) noncontiguous tracts may be the subject of a community lease even though
the lack of contiguity is one factor showing the absence of a community
intent; (3) a community lease may be formed even though the lease does
not cover 100 per cent of the mineral interest; and (4) a community
lease is not dissolved by partition where the deeds implementing the partition use language that they are "subject to" the lease.
The court's first holding is questionable and probably will cause more
problems than it solves. If there is uniformity of interest, the question
immediately arises why it is helpful or necessary (exclusive of the present
case) to consider the act of leasing an act of communitization. This rationale must be predicated upon a determination that there are two or
more "tracts" included within the leased area and will inevitably lead to
hazardous definitional problems concerning "tracts." For example, if two
people, each owning an undivided one-half interest in a one-acre tract of
land, execute the same oil and gas lease on that one acre, can it be said
that there is a communitization? Presumably, if there is any basis upon
which to argue that the one acre consists of two "tracts," then under the
theory of this case there would be a communitization.
IX.

VACANCY

STATUTE

6

In Hughes v. Atlantic Refining Co. the supreme court held that in a
vacancy suit the applicant may not use the device of a class action to obtain jurisdiction over persons actually named in the vacancy application
previously filed by the applicant with the Commissioner of the General
Land Office. Instead, the applicant must name and obtain jurisdiction over
each person in the district court litigation. Moreover, in Hughes the plaintiff's failure to name each separate necessary party was not a fatal jurisdictional defect, and the plaintiff was therefore given opportunity on remand to name and bring in all necessary parties. Incidentally, the court
took a pragmatic approach with respect to the rights of intervening parties in the Fairway Field Unit. These necessary parties number in excess of
five thousand. The court indicated quite clearly that the class action procedure may be used with respect to these parties and to all other intervening parties.

"Howell v. Union Producing Co., 392 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1968).
66424 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1968).

